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REMEDIES, ANTITRUST LAW, AND MICROSOFT:
COMMENT ON SHAPIRO
KEITH

N.

HYLTON*

The subject of remedies is a relatively under-theorized area of antitrust law, and Professor Shapiro has done the antitrust community a
great favor by offering some innovative and useful theoretical insights
on the design of antitrust remedies.' He applies his theoretical insights
to the Microsoft III case 2 to reach the conclusion that the remedies
adopted were inadequate to restore competition in the market for
software platforms. In this review, I will offer additional theoretical insights on remedies and explain my reasons for rejecting his conclusions
on Microsoft III.
I. THEORY OF REMEDIES AND ANTITRUST LAW
Remedies in civil litigation typically come in one of two forms: the
legal remedy which consists of monetary damages, and the equitable
remedy, which may take the form of an injunction or an order for specific performance. Economic analysis has been used since the eighteenth century to suggest economically optimal remedies for violations
of the law.'
There is now a vast literature on the economics of remedies, but most
of it deals with monetary damages, especially the difference between
compensatory and punitive damages. This literature is not readily appli* Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law, Boston University.

'Carl Shapiro, Microsoft: A Remedial Failure, supra this issue, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 739
(2009).
2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), remanded to 231
F.Supp.2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d
1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
3 CESARE BECCARIA & VOLTAIRE, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (4th ed.
Lawbook Exchange 2006) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (James Henderson Burns & Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart

eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789) (an authoritative edition with a new introduction
by F. Rosen and an interpretive essay by H.L.A. Hart).
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cable to antitrust remedies, especially those adopted as the result of government prosecutions, which are often injunctions governing specific
patterns of conduct or contractual terms.
Much of the modern economic literature on remedies can be traced
to articles by Gary Becker and by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed. 4 Becker's article on crime and punishment distinguishes reme5
dies based on the goals of complete deterrence and internalization.
Complete deterrence means putting a stop to the defendant's harmful
conduct. The internalization goal, in contrast, does not aim for a complete stop to the defendant's conduct, but rather to force the defendant
to pay for the injuries inflicted on victims.
The classic article on remedies by Calabresi and Melamed introduces
the distinction between property rules and liability rules. Property rules
consist of orders that enjoin conduct that might impose a loss on a victim, and liability rules consist of orders requiring an injurer to pay damages to the victim.
The distinctions identified in the Becker and Calabresi-Melamed articles allow us to separate the theoretical considerations behind the goal
of a remedy and the type of remedy used. It is natural to think of equitable remedies as serving the function of complete deterrence and also to
think of liability rules as serving the function of internalizing the losses
suffered by victims. But equitable remedies can serve either the complete deterrence or internalization goal, and the same can be said of
liability rules.
The goal of a property rule, which is to put an end to injurious conduct, is best implemented by remedies that completely deter the defendant's conduct. The goal of a liability rule can be implemented with
remedies that either internalize the victim's losses or have the same ef6
fect as a liability judgment.
To give a concrete example, and to start connecting this discussion to
antitrust, suppose the monopolist imposes a loss in surplus of $100 on
4 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
5 Becker argued in favor of a shift toward the internalization principle in criminal
punishment (Becker, supranote 4, at 193-98), and suggested antitrust as an area of criminal law enforcement in which fines that internalize the social cost of anticompetitive conduct would be desirable (id. at 198-99).
6 Given that deterrence is the only goal I am considering now, it is not necessary that
the liability rule compensate the victim, though that would be a desirable goal in general.
The level of deterrence required under the internalization scheme could be achieved
through penalties that are collected by the state.
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consumers in each transaction and gains $1000 in profit in each transaction. This could occur because the monopolistic surcharge over the
competitive price is $100 on each transaction, and the monopolist enjoys an efficiency advantage over its rivals of $900. Suppose that the conduct that gives the firm a monopoly also results in superior efficiencyfor example, the creation of a technological entry barrier. A remedy
that internalizes the losses suffered by consumers would require the defendant to pay $100 for each harmed consumer. 7 A remedy that serves
the complete deterrence function, however, would require the monopolist to pay $1000 for each harmed consumer. The $1000 penalty would
strip the defendant of any gains from the monopolizing conduct.8 The
$100 liability judgment, however, will not completely deter the firm's
monopolizing conduct. If the firm knew when it engaged in the conduct
that led to the monopoly (creating the technological entry barrier) that
it would have to pay only $100 per transaction as a penalty, it would not
have been deterred from the conduct. But if the firm knew that it would
have to pay $1000 per transaction, it would have been deterred. 9
As this example suggests, the complete deterrence remedy, which
eliminates gains from monopolizing conduct, can destroy incentives for
efficiency as well as incentives for monopolization. If the creation of a
technological entry barrier gives the monopolizing firm an efficiency advantage of $900 per transaction, then it is possible that the efficiency
gains from its conduct substantially exceed the losses in consumer surplus. Moreover, in a dynamic world of competition, those efficiency
gains may later result in a lower cost basis on which future competition
will occur. If the efficiency gains from the creation of a technological
entry barrier substantially exceed consumer losses, a remedy that de7 An economically optimal penalty would require the monopolist to pay a fine equal to
the sum of the monopoly surcharge and the forgone consumer surplus. See William M.
Landes, Optimal Sanctionsfor Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 (1983). Setting the
penalty equal the surcharge would internalize a large part of the welfare loss of consumers, but not all of it.
8I am assuming that the punishment authority will identify and penalize monopolizing firms with perfect accuracy. If the punishment authority identified monopolizing
firms only 50 percent of the time, then it would be necessary to apply a multiplier to the
penalty. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AMER. ECON. RFv. 880 (1979); Keith N. Hylton &
Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied? 21 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 388 (2005).
9 A penalty of $1000 will obviously remove any incentive for the firm to take the action
that generates the monopoly. However, a lesser penalty might have the same effect. The
firm will have an incentive to take the action as long as the present discounted value of
the stream of monopoly profits exceeds the cost of the action. A penalty of $1000 reduces
the present discounted value of monopoly profits to zero. But as long as the present
discounted value is reduced below the cost of the monopolizing action (e.g., creating the
technological barrier to entry), the firm will be deterred.
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stroys the incentive for such conduct would be socially undesirable. It
would enhance consumer wealth in the short run, but impoverish society in the long run. It follows that the gain-elimination theory of remedies is best reserved for instances in which the efficiency gains from the
defendant's conduct are nonexistent or minimal. 0
One general lesson from the theory of remedies, illustrated in the
foregoing example, is that complete-deterrence (or gain-eliminating)
remedies are not desirable when the defendant's conduct is socially beneficial overall (i.e., the gains to society exceed the costs). Rather, internalization-based remedies are desirable when the defendant's conduct is
socially beneficial overall. Complete deterrence remedies should be limited to cases, such as pure theft, when the defendant's conduct is not
socially beneficial.
This broad-brush description of the theory of remedies deals only
with monetary remedies. However, the basic ideas can be transferred to
a setting in which only equitable remedies are on the menu. This is what
we observe in antitrust enforcement actions by government agents.
The equitable remedies that would correspond to the goal of internalizing the losses of consumers, in antitrust, would be narrowly tailored
and aim to terminate specific practices that impose losses on consumers
in excess of any countervailing efficiencies. In this approach to the remedy, the antitrust standard and corresponding remedy would be applied
in a manner similar to the negligence rule in tort law. The remedy
would consist of an injunction covering a narrow and specific pattern of
conduct that is deemed a violation of a more general antitrust standard,
such as the rule of reason test. A specific act (e.g., a refusal to deal) that
is determined to be anticompetitive would be enjoined (and could also
be the subject of follow-on damage lawsuits). The internalization approach is consistent with the issuance of detailed regulatory remedies in
antitrust cases."
10In the example in the text, each transaction generated a profit of $1000: $100 of
which consisted of surplus transferred from consumers, and $900 of which was due to the
superior efficiency of the monopolist. Suppose instead that $999 consisted of surplus
transferred from consumers and only $1 was due to the superior efficiency of the monopolist. Technically, the internalization remedy (this time set equal to $999) is still appropriate. But the administrative cost of determining whether complete deterrence or
internalization is the appropriate goal of the remedy might outweigh the benefits of appropriate classification in this case.
" This claim can be applied to the monopolization example considered earlier. The
equitable remedy corresponding to the internalization goal would prevent the monopolist from transferring $100 of surplus from consumers, but would allow the monopolist to
pocket the $900 of profit attributable to superior efficiency. An order preventing the firm
from charging above the competitive price would accomplish this goal. An alternative
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The equitable remedies that would correspond to the goal of complete deterrence would make substantially deeper inroads into the defendant's incentives. One extreme version of the complete deterrence
approach would be a structural remedy that disables the defendant monopolist from engaging in a broad and varied pattern of conduct. For
example, an order splitting Microsoft into a platform software seller and
an applications software seller would, under the theory of the trial court
in Microsoft III, completely deter Microsoft's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct by disabling the firm from adopting any of the strategies alleged as anticompetitive, and eliminating, or at least substantially reducing the gains from that conduct. Similarly, the dissolution remedy in
StandardOil," breaking the company into thirty-four regional firms, was
designed to disable the firm from pursuing any of its allegedly anticompetitive strategies as well as eliminating the gains from those strategies.
Short of a dissolution order, there are other remedies courts can impose that would have the effect of completely deterring the defendant
monopolist's conduct. In general, where a dissolution order might appear inappropriate, as the appellate court found in Microsoft III, courts
can impose more limited complete deterrence remedies that seek to remove any gains enjoyed by the defendant from its anticompetitive conduct. One example would be a penalty that forces the defendant to
disgorge any gains earned from the anticompetitive conduct, inflated to
take into account the delay in punishment and the probability of
nonpunishment. Or the defendant firm could be forced to share physical or intellectual property with competitors, 13 or to permit competitors
to enter into contracts that were foreclosed by the defendant, and so on.
Quite a large number of potential remedies could be imagined. The
general goal of these remedies, however, would be to remove any gain
enjoyed by the defendant from its anticompetitive conduct.
To illustrate the complete deterrence approach with equitable remedies, return to the example in which the monopolist adopts an anticompetitive practice-such as a technological barrier to entry-that harms
each consumer by $100 and permits it to gain $1000 in each transaction.
A monetary penalty that satisfied the goal of complete deterrence of
anticompetitive conduct would effectively tax the monopolist $1000 per
would be an order requiring the monopolist to license the technological innovation in a
manner that permits it to continue to earn its profits from efficiency.
12 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78-80 (1911); Stephen Labaton, Big Oil:
The Regulators; Merger Deal Can Count on a Gantlet of Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at
C4.
IS Shapiro, supranote 1, at 750-51 (referring to remedies that require the disclosure of
intellectual property).
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transaction. With equitable remedies as the only ones available on the
menu, the remedies would have to be chosen with the aim of eliminating all gains that can be attributed to the anticompetitive innovation. If
complete deterrence of anticompetitive conduct is the goal, then a
court might require the defendant to share physical or intellectual property with competitors. If the sharing remedy forced the defendant to
lose an amount that is at least as great as its earnings from its anticompetitive conduct, then the sharing remedy would set up the same incentive
4
sought by a gain-eliminating monetary penalty.'
The equitable remedies described so far fall along a spectrum ranging
from structural remedies to regulatory remedies of varying levels of expansiveness or intrusiveness. The structural remedies, such as dissolution, aim to disable the monopolist from engaging in conduct that
enhances or maintains its monopoly. The regulatory remedies range
from ones that seek to eliminate gains to ones that seek, in effect, to
regulate conduct in the same manner as would a liability finding in a
15
negligence case (i.e., narrowly tailored remedies).
The antitrust cases have illustrated the range of potential remedies
suggested by theory. In Standard Oil and in American Tobacco,' 6 the Supreme Court upheld dissolution remedies. In United Shoe, the district
court rejected a proposed dissolution remedy and adopted narrowly tailored regulatory remedies. 7 Judge Wyzanski held that United Shoe had
to offer its shoe machines for sale in any market in which it leased shoe
machines.' 8 The company was also required to separate its service
charge from its leasing fee, shorten its leases, and remove other restric14 The example can be made a bit more complicated, to apply it to a wider range of
cases. Suppose the monopolist gains $1000 in each transaction and of that $1000 gain,
$600 can be attributed to anticompetitive conduct. Suppose, for example, that the monopolist gains part of its efficiency advantage from anticompetitive conduct that blocks
access to a cost-reducing technology to competitors. The internalizing remedy would be
limited to $100 in each transaction. The complete deterrence remedy would seek to tax
the monopolist $600 on each transaction, allowing the monopolist to pocket the remaining $400 due entirely to its superior efficiency. If only equitable remedies are available,
the remedy would be chosen to force the defendant to regurgitate the gains attributable
to anticompetitive conduct.
1 As discussed above, supra note 8, 1 have implicitly assumed that the likelihood of
detection is 100 percent. If the likelihood of detection is 50 percent, the optimal monetary penalties would have to be multiplied in order to bring about the optimal level of
deterrence (and this is true whether the goal is internalization or complete deterrence).
This argument also applies to equitable remedies that attempt to replicate the effect of
optimal monetary penalties. The equitable remedies would have to be made more severe
in order to compensate for the lower detection probability.
16United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
17United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348-51 (D. Mass. 1953).
18Id. at 349.
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tive contractual features. 9 The government was unsatisfied with the limited remedies adopted and eventually petitioned the court for
additional restrictions in 1966.20
II. REMEDY NORMS AND THE FORTRESS FABLE
With the general concepts set out above, we can turn to the remedial
norms stated in Microsoft III and endorsed by Professor Shapiro. Profes2
sor Shapiro describes them as follows: '
1. "unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct"
2. "terminate the illegal monopoly"
3. "deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation"
4. "ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future"
Shapiro excludes the second goal, termination, as inappropriate in the
Microsoft case. His fundamental charge is that the court failed by embracing a limited view of the fourth goal and refusing to pursue the first and
third goals.
Shapiro provides an interesting story to convey his remedial failure
thesis. I will refer to his story as the Fortress Fable, which runs as follows.
A monopolizing firm can be viewed as setting up a walled fortress to
defend its position in the market. Its consumers are trapped within the
walls of the fortress. Rivals can be viewed as invading armies drifting in
on the waves. Suppose in any given period the probability of an invader
successfully overturning the monopoly is 5 percent. Suppose one year
an invader with an extremely strong chance (say 20 percent) of overturning the monopoly appears. The monopolist adopts extremely aggressive tactics against the unusually strong entrant. The monopolist
fired spears at the earlier hordes of incoming invaders, but it fires cannon balls at the unusually strong invader.
The proper remedy according to Shapiro is to weaken the monopolist's defenses to put consumers in the probabilistic position they would
have been in had the monopolist not taken its unusual steps to eliminate the strong invader. Thus, if the monopolist has eliminated an invader that had a 20 percent chance of ending its monopoly, then the
remedy should consist of blasting holes in the fortress walls so that con19 Id.

at 349-51.
See, e.g., PHILLIP

AREEDA, Louis KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 393 n.22 (6th ed. 2004).
20

21 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 740 (quoting from United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001), which in turn quoted from United States v. Ford Motor Co., 405
U.S. 562, 577 (1972), and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250

(1968)).
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sumers are in the long term in the same position as if that unusually
strong invader had not been eliminated.
To give a somewhat casual but intuitive picture, suppose the level of
background threat puts the monopolist at risk of extinction of 25 percent every year. The monopolist has an expected life of four years. Now
suppose an especially strong entrant appears. If that entrant were to remain in the market every year, the monopolist's risk of extinction would
be 33 percent every year, implying an expected life span of three years.
Suppose the monopolist takes unusually aggressive measures to beat
back the strong entrant in the first year, causing the entrant to retreat
and never return. The monopolist will have added a year to its life in
expectation. One approach to punishing the monopolist would be to
raise the extinction threat for the second and third years to 50 percent.
That would eliminate any life-expectancy gain enjoyed by the monopolist from its aggressive policy in the first year.22
The Fortress Fable has immediate implications for the proper approach to antitrust remedies. It suggests that a sound policy would embrace remedial norms one (unfettering the market) and three
(eliminating gains), and would also take a broad view of the fourth remedial goal (eliminating monopolizing practices). The Fable advances
our thinking about remedies by offering a neat model of monopolization combined with a theory that suggests a specific function for
remedies.
III. WEAKNESSES IN THE FORTRESS FABLE'S FOUNDATIONS
Shapiro's Fortress Fable builds in some assumptions that limit its applicability to many real-world competition settings and especially to
Microsoft Il. I will start with the Fable's foundations. We are told to imagine that an unusually strong entrant arrives on the waves one year, is
beaten back by the monopolist who controls the fortress, and the entrant never returns. Thereafter, the monopolist enjoys life in his fortress, occasionally beating back lesser entrants or watching their ships
shatter on the rocks at the foot of the fortress walls.

22 It appears that in Shapiro's model the strong entrant arrives in only one year, as if
carried in by the waves in an unusual storm. The subsequent extinction probabilities have
to be increased to reflect the incremental extinction presented in that one year. Moreover, the goal of the social planner is to adjust extinction probabilities in the future in a
manner that gives consumers the same expected present value of consumer surplus that
they would have had if the unusually strong entrant had not been killed off by the
monopolist.
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In one respect, this is a very common story of entry deterrence. Entry
deterrence theories, such as the predatory pricing theory, typically assume that an entrant appears at the market's doorstep, is beaten back by
the monopolist, and never returns. However, if the monopolist in the
Fortress Fable is enjoying supracompetitive profits after beating back entrants, those profits will serve as a signal for other strong entrants. Indeed, under the standard theory of competition, the greater the fortress
monopolist's profits, the greater the call to entrants to attempt to topple
the fortress. Entry deterrence theories such as Shapiro's Fortress Fable
ask us to set aside this basic postulate of the theory of competition and
assume listless potential entrants who are not especially motivated by the
prospect of earning high profits.
In a version of the Fortress Fable that allows for the fact that profits
attract entry (and more profits attract more entry), the fortress monopolist would have to behave somewhat like a competitive firm to avoid inducing entry from many strong entrants. The fortress monopolist would
have to reduce its output price and share the benefits of efficiency gains
with consumers. An alternative model along these lines would probably
better describe the real world of competition among dominant firms
than does Shapiro's Fortress Fable.
It may help to translate this alternative version of the Fable to the
Microsoft III case. Microsoft was never alone in the operating system market and never had a monopoly on all of the world's talented software
engineers. If Microsoft had behaved as the unconstrained fortress monopolist in Shapiro's Fable, it probably would have lost its market share
to a competitor, such as Apple. Microsoft was able to retain its high market share by setting a competitive price for its operating system, in relation to alternatives, and by sharing the benefits of efficiency gains (in
the form of enhancements in the quality of the operating system) with
consumers. As time passed, Windows incorporated more and more
pieces of software that at one time had stood alone and fetched a substantial price. These elements were incorporated into Windows at a fraction of the price that consumers had previously paid. This is not the
behavior of a fortress monopolist. It is closer to the conduct of a dominant firm that faces the constant pressure of losing customers to innovative and aggressive competitors.
The Fortress Fable raises additional questions when applied to the
theory of remedies in the Microsoft case. In the Fable, the monopolist
maintains its position by beating back the unusually strong entrants.
One can easily imagine how to tell such a story as part of the Fable:
perhaps the fortress monopolist fires cannons at the strong entrant or
sets its ships on fire. In each of these defensive scenarios, the consumers
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who are trapped within the walls of the fortress monopolist gain nothing
in return from the monopolist's defensive actions. They simply watch in
horror as the fortress monopolist destroys one potential white knight
after another.
Under this view of the fortress monopolist's actions, it is clear that its
defensive actions do not benefit consumers at all. The monopolist's defenses are simply methods of stealing consumer surplus; of delaying the
day in which the monopoly terminates and the consumers enjoy the
competitive level of consumer surplus.
It follows under this theory that remedial goals one (unfetter markets) and three (eliminate gains) appear sound. Because no one gains
from the monopolist's defensive actions, he should be completely deterred from taking them. To return to the general theory of remedies
set out in the first part of this comment, because there would be no
offsetting efficiency or consumer welfare gains from the defendant's
conduct in this scenario, the complete deterrence approach to remedies
would be appropriate.
The Microsoft III case presents a quite different picture from this fable;
one that falls far short of supporting the expansive theory of remedies
urged by Shapiro. Microsoft's core defensive action was the development of an Internet browser that served as an alternative to Netscape's
browser. Although this defensive maneuver did substantial damage to
Netscape, it did so only because it was offered at a competitive price
(free) and eventually proved to be a superior product. Consumers were
offered an alternative that enhanced their welfare.
On a more basic level, it is quite a stretch even to accept the fortress
wall analogy in Microsoft III. The fortress wall is a metaphor for the "applications barrier to entry." It is amusing, to say the least, to compare the
applications barrier to a wall, like the one that used to divide Berlin.
The applications barrier, rather than trapping consumers within a chaotic administrative system, provided them an unusually efficient means
of gaining access to software applications. The applications barrier is
analogous to the information-sharing network in Associated Press,23 which
permitted a greater range of news to be provided to consumers more
efficiently.
We should return for a moment to the general theory of remedies
sketched previously. Microsoft's core defensive action involved conduct
that hurt a competitor and at the same time offered substantial benefits

23Associated

Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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to consumers. This is not the type of conduct that the law should aim to
deter completely by eliminating gains to the defendant.
The complete deterrence theory neatly fits antitrust when we are looking at conduct that offers no efficiency gains or benefits to consumers at
all-benefits that are trivial in comparison to the losses imposed on consumers. A complete deterrence approach would make sense in the case
of a price-fixing cartel that is motivated solely by a desire to earn monopoly profits. In such a case, the defendant's conduct offers no offsetting
benefits to consumers; it is nothing more than a taking of consumer
surplus.
However, when a dominant firm introduces a new product to compete against that of a rival, that action should not be viewed as a pure
theft of consumer surplus. In most cases, consumer surplus is greatly
enhanced by the introduction of a new product.
This implies that the proper general approach to the remedy in a case
like Microsoft III is to prefer narrowly tailored internalizing remedies, if
any remedy is deemed appropriate. When the defendant has engaged in
substantial innovation and efficiency-enhancing investment, courts
should adopt narrowly-tailored remedies that target the specific conduct
that is found to violate the antitrust laws while doing as little as possible
to discourage the defendant's innovation and investment. The district
court (after remand) appears to have adopted this approach in Microsoft
III,24 and that is something to applaud rather than criticize.
There are more general lessons here for the proper approach to the
remedial norms set out in Microsoft III. One can sort the list of remedial
goals running from lightest to most severe as follows: (1) ensure that
there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future; (2) unfetter the market from anticompetitive conduct; (3) deny to
the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation; and (4) terminate the
illegal monopoly.
As a general rule, where the efficiency or consumer welfare gains
from the defendant's conduct are trivial or nonexistent, as in the case of
naked price fixing, all four remedial goals could be appropriate. One
could argue that the termination remedy is excessive because it may be
sufficient to adopt remedies that work to eliminate any gains enjoyed
from the anticompetitive conduct. But it may be quite difficult to design
remedies that eliminate any prospect of gain from anticompetitive con24

Shapiro, supra note 1, at 754-59 (criticizing narrow approach to remedy by district
court on remand).
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duct.2 5 If so, then the termination remedy should be available as a fallback option.
On the other hand, where the efficiency gains from the defendant's
conduct are substantial and obvious, as in the case of monopolization
through technological innovation, the first remedial goal provides the
most useful rule. Moreover, the first remedial goal should be interpreted as a basis for setting out narrowly tailored injunctions.
This suggests that the four remedial goals should be treated as a sliding scale that responds to the balance between consumer welfare losses
and countervailing gains in efficiency or welfare. If the ratio of losses to
gains is relatively low, the first remedial goal should be viewed as sufficient. As the ratio of losses to gains increases, the remaining three remedial goals become justifiable.
To sum up, if the Fortress Fable is to be applied to the Microsoft III
case, it would have to be modified substantially. The fortress monopolist, in the new version of the Fable, would have to be observed cutting
prices and sharing efficiency gains to prevent being toppled over by a
strong rival. Moreover, rather than beating back rivals with destructive
methods, the new version of the story would show the fortress monopolist offering gifts to consumers in order to prevent them from accepting
the gifts of rivals. The rivals would be beaten back in this alternative
version, but not in a way that harmed consumers.
IV. SIN NO MORE AS AN INADEQUATE REMEDY
Professor Shapiro describes the remedy adopted in Microsoft III as a
"sin no more" order,26 which is easy to criticize as inadequate on deterrence grounds. A sin-no-more order simply tells the monopolizing firm
not to do it again-or else. But if that is the punishment the monopolizing firm expects for any future violations, then violating the law is always
a good bet. With some probability it will get away scot-free, and with the
remaining probability, it will be caught and told not to do it again.
If the remedy amounted to nothing more than a sin-no-more order,
this would be a valid criticism of the Microsoft III remedy and of the
antitrust remedies in many cases. The difficulty is that it is not easy to
25 If complete deterrence (rather than internalization) is the goal, then the punishment authority should seek to eliminate the prospect of gain, which may require a penalty
that is greater than the minimum necessary to eliminate realized gains. This issue is
closely intertwined with the probability of detection. If the probability of detection is 100
percent, then the minimum penalty that eliminates realized gains will be sufficient for
complete deterrence purposes.
26 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 755.
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design a remedy that efficiently secures all of the objectives of an antitrust prosecution. Judge Wyzanski provided perhaps the most insightful
and honest description of the problems facing an antitrust court in the
remedy phase in the United Shoe case. 27 And Wyzanksi imposed an order
that amounted to sin-no-more in that case. The likely reason was that
the dissolution order proposed by the government would have punished
United Shoe (as well as its consumers) for the firm's efficiency-enhancing investments, in addition to conduct that may have created entry barriers. 28 Judge Wyzanski recognized that the complete deterrence theory
was an inappropriate one for remedies in United Shoe.
Sin-no-more orders are not necessarily weak in their deterrent effect
in today's litigation climate. A finding of an antitrust violation will be
followed by class action lawsuits. In monopolization cases, which involve
conduct that is easily detected, follow-on lawsuits are likely to be sufficient on deterrence grounds. Multiplying damage awards makes sense
when the defendant's conduct is difficult to detect, as in the case of
price fixing. But monopolization occurs out in the open in plain view.
theory for multiplyGiven this, there is little justification in deterrence
29
cases.
monopolization
in
awards
damage
ing
Moreover, today there are foreign competition regimes that take a
keen interest in monopolization cases brought against dominant firms
in the United States. The plaintiffs who litigated and sought government
prosecution in U.S. courts against Microsoft have sought similar actions
from foreign enforcement agencies. The trend in the European Union
has been to take a stricter approach to monopoly abuse allegations, with
less concern exhibited for undesirable efficiency implications.
I think we have reached the point where a sin-no-more remedy, in a
monopolization case, can no longer be criticized as inadequate on deterrence grounds. In the United States, such remedies will bring forth
class action lawyers. In international markets, they will generate investigations and punishments from foreign competition agencies.
27 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348-51 (D. Mass. 1953).
28 The court noted United Shoe's research and product-quality investments in several
passages. See id. at 330 (discussing research investments); id. at 322 (quality of service); id.
at 339 (research and patents).
29 Of course, one could justify multiplying an award by a factor greater than one to take
into account the forgone consumer surplus. See, e.g., KITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW:
ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAw EVOLUTION 46-47 (2003). But the multiplication
factor required to incorporate forgone consumer surplus would probably be relatively
modest, on the order of a 50 percent increase in the damage award. The litigation costs
incurred from follow-on litigation could easily exceed the increment required to internalize the forgone consumer surplus.

786

ANTITRUST LAW

JOURNAL

[Vol. 75

Indeed, we have reached the point that future Justice Departments
should consider the follow-on conduct by domestic plaintiffs attorneys
and foreign competition authorities when deciding what remedies to
propose for (and perhaps whether to prosecute) a monopolization case
in the United States. The European Union's case against Microsoft for
bundling its media player was based on the same theories as the Internet
bundling case in the United States.30 The EU order requiring Microsoft
to offer a version of Windows that does not include the media player is
an example of the type of remedy that could come out of foreign competition regimes, where the courts are not as interested in the efficiency
implications of their decisions as are the courts in the United States.
Such orders are not only costly for the dominant firm defendant, but for
consumers as well. By raising the costs of the dominant firm defendant
without offering benefits to consumers-as appears to be true of the
order requiring Microsoft to offer Windows without its media playersuch remedies reduce competition and diminish consumer surplus.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Shapiro's analysis of the aftermath of Microsoft III provides
an innovative and useful theoretical framework for analyzing remedies
in monopolization cases. I hope it will encourage antitrust and industrial organization scholars to further explore the design of economically
optimal antitrust remedies. The application of Shapiro's framework to
the Microsoft III case is a different matter. The expansive approach to
remedies that he urges may be appropriate for some cases, but not for
the antitrust litigation against Microsoft.

30 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601,
Instance) (CFI Decision 2007).
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